How generational stage affects agency conflict between family managers and family owners

  1. Blanco Mazagatos, Virginia
  2. Quevedo Puente, Esther de
  3. Delgado García, Juan Bautista
Revista:
Notas técnicas: [continuación de Documentos de Trabajo FUNCAS]

ISSN: 1988-8767

Any de publicació: 2014

Número: 743

Tipus: Document de treball

Altres publicacions en: Notas técnicas: [continuación de Documentos de Trabajo FUNCAS]

Resum

This study compares the effects on firm returns of family managers� ownership and various governance mechanisms in family firms at different generational stages. We analyze a sample of unlisted Spanish family firms totally owned by a family and find that family managers� ownership benefits firm performance more in second-and-subsequent-generation firms than in first-generation ones. Direct control exercised by family owners over family managers also has a more intense influence on performance of second-and-following-generation firms; in contrast, the effect of family governance mechanisms (succession plans, family protocols, family councils) on firm performance is not related to the firm�s generational stage.