Overinvestment, leverage and financial system liquiditya challenging approach

  1. Óscar López-de-Foronda
  2. Florencio López-de-Silanes
  3. Félix J. López-Iturriaga
  4. Marcos Santamaría-Mariscal
Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 22

Número: 2

Páginas: 96-104

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2018.08.001 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la influencia de la liquidez del sistema financiero y el apalancamiento empresarial en la sobreinversión de una empresa. Postulamos que cuando los fondos externos están fácilmente disponibles, como en los períodos monetarios expansivos, la deuda pierde su papel tradicional como mecanismo de control gerencial. En cambio, el suministro de liquidez sistémica da como resultado un apalancamiento empresarial que agrava el problema de la sobreinversión. Utilizando una muestra de más de 12.400 empresas de 25 países de la OCDE entre 2003 y 2014, nuestros resultados muestran una relación significativa y positiva entre el apalancamiento empresarial y la sobreinversión cuando la liquidez del sistema financiero es alta, lo que confirma el cambio en el papel que juega el apalancamiento. A nivel macroeconómico, nuestra investigación plantea ciertas salvedades con respecto a las inyecciones de liquidez en todo el mundo. A nivel microeconómico,

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Información de financiación

We acknowledge the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for financial support (Project ECO2017-84864-P and ECO2014-56102-P).

Financiadores

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