Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the boardevidence from Spanish cajas

  1. Pablo de Andres 1
  2. Inigo Garcia-Rodriguez 2
  3. M. Elena Romero-Merino 2
  4. Marcos Santamaria-Mariscal 2
  1. 1 University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain.
  2. 2 University of Burgos, Burgos, Spain
Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444 2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2021

Volumen: 24

Número: 2

Páginas: 174-191

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1177/2340944420924417 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these “hidden” political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas’ performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas’ performance.

Información de financiación

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